## EXHIBIT 85

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                   IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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                             ATLANTA DIVISION
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          DONNA CURLING, ET AL.,
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              Plaintiffs,
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                                            CIVIL ACTION NO.
          vs.
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          BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, ET
                                            1:17-CV-2989-AT
          AL,
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              Defendants.
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            VIDEOTAPED 30(b)(6) DEPOSITION OF OFFICE OF THE
                            SECRETARY OF STATE
14
                     (through William "Chris" Harvey)
15
                    (Taken by the Curling Plaintiffs)
                             January 28, 2022
16
                                8:40 a.m.
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           Reported by: Debra M. Druzisky, CCR-B-1848
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Page 10 Okay. So let me jump to the topics. you were designated on two topics, topics 12 and 18. Do you see topic 12 up here? I do. Α. Ο. And it's: "Communications with the U.S. Election Assistance Commission regarding any software changes involving Georgia's current election system or otherwise relating to any actual or contemplated request for E.A.C. approval for any aspect of Georgia's current election system." And am I right that you're designated to testify on behalf of the Secretary's office on that topic today? Α. That's correct. What did you do to prepare yourself to Q. testify on that topic?

- A. I spoke with counsel and just went through my memory and recollection about communications with the E.A.C.
- Q. Did you speak with anyone other than counsel for this topic?
  - A. No.

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Page 25 any differences. 1 Ο. If you wanted to learn the details of what 3 was done in that examination, who would you ask? I'd probably ask Jordan Fuchs. 4 Α. 5 And do you know, for that examination, did Pro V&V look at the hash values on the equipment? 6 7 Object. He's testified MR. RUSSO: he wasn't involved and didn't know 8 9 anything about it. 10 MR. CROSS: If he doesn't know, he 11 can say he doesn't know. 12 BY MR. CROSS: 13 Ο. If you don't know --14 I don't know. I don't know exactly what 15 they did. 16 Okay. All right. That's fine. 17 wanted to see if there was any details you had. 18 To the software change in the fall Okay. 19 of 2020 we mentioned before, did the E.A.C. express 20 any concerns about that? 21 Not that I'm aware of. 2.2 Okay. All right. If you can scroll down Ο. 23 to topic 18. It's on -- oh, there are no page 24 numbers on this. Sorry. It's the last topic in 25 Exhibit 1, and just let me know if you need help.

Page 26 1 Α. Okay. Ο. Do you have that in front of you, 3 Mr. Harvey? I do. 4 Α. 5 Okay. And do you see the topic here is, the Secretary's office -- "your" refers to the 6 7 Secretary's office: [As read] "The Secretary's 8 9 office's process for preserving information within your possession, 10 11 custody or control potentially 12 relevant for this matter, including 13 any communications with counties or 14 other entities or individuals 15 regarding the same." 16 Do you see that? 17 Yes, sir, I do. Α. 18 And do you understand you were designated Q. 19 to testify on that topic as well? 20 Α. Yes. 21 Okay. What did you do to prepare for that Ο. 2.2 topic? 23 I spoke with counsel. I reviewed a couple 24 of E-mails on this topic and sort of searched my 2.5 memory for any relevant information.

Page 50 1 statements or evidence about exactly what had gone on if it was a significant issue. 3 Q. So you respond to Ms. Watson in this E-mail: 4 5 "10-4, I assume you're 6 investigating." 7 Do you see that? 8 Α. Yes. 9 And was there an investigation done of the 10 concern that was raised by Laura Jones here on 11 November 5th of 2020? 12 I don't know. I assume there -- I assume Α. 13 there was. This is certainly the kind of thing that would have risen to the level of an 14 15 investigation. 16 Who would you ask if you wanted to know 17 whether there was an investigation done and what 18 the outcome was? 19 Well, now I'd ask the current -- I think Α. 20 it's the interim investigator. His name is James 21 Callaway. Frances Watson has moved on. She's no 2.2 longer there. So I would ask Interim Chief 23 Investigator Callaway to -- he would be able to 24 give the status of any investigations. 2.5 Q. When --

A. It would be in the investigations division.

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- Q. Do you know whether any steps were made to preserve and collect documents from the investigations division for this case?
- A. I know that the investigative files are kept for I think either five or seven years as just a normal -- in the normal course of business. I don't know specifically if attempts were made to get them or not or -- as part of discovery.
- Q. If you look at the concern raised here by Laura Jones on November 5th, 2020, there are a number of things that she points out here, but one of the things she points out is that they used election equipment where the election database doors that had been opened and seals had been broken.

Do you see that?

- A. I know that she said the doors were open. Let's see. Well, she says that:
  - "...we did use all the other machines that had the election database door open."

I don't think she says the seals were broken. But I guess if the doors are open, then --

Page 53 1 If you look at the third line, do Yeah. 2. you see where she writes -- well, we can start at 3 the beginning so you've got the whole context. She 4 says: 5 "When we opened the large cabinets 6 containing the voting machines, we 7 discovered that most of the voting machines' 'election database' doors 8 9 were wide open and not secured with a 10 zip tie" --11 Α. Right. 12 -- "with serial" -- she goes --Q. 13 Α. I see that. 14 Yeah. She goes on: Ο. 15 "Seals were already broken or a 16 zip tie was put on but was not put 17 through the door." 18 Do you see that? 19 I do. Α. 20 You also indicate --Q. 21 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Sorry. I'm sorry, 2.2 Mr. Cross. There's something -- this is 23 the videographer. There's something a little weird going on with the audio. 24 25 So if you could --

Page 54 MR. CROSS: With Mr. Harvey? 1 2. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: I don't know if 3 it's coming from Mr. Harvey or from your end, but --4 5 MR. CROSS: Oh. 6 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: -- if you guys 7 could just give each other maybe a half a 8 beat between questions and answers, maybe 9 that'll help. I'm not sure. But there's 10 some kind of interference. 11 MR. CROSS: Okay. 12 BY MR. CROSS: 13 Ο. Okay. Mr. Harvey, do you see that she 14 indicates I believe one of the machines -- well, to 15 be precise, she says: 16 [As read] "One of our machines 17 did show one ballot had been cast on 18 it even though the machines were 19 supposed to show a zero balance at 20 that point." 21 Do you see that? 2.2 Α. Right. And then she goes on to say: "We did not use this machine..." 23 Right. That one she did not use. 24 Ο. 25 Is it fair to say that, using voting

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machines in an election where the election database doors were open and seals were broken before the election began, that that would not comply with state policies?

A. I think the regulation is that, if there is some type of discrepancy, either with a seal or some concern, it has to be essentially -- I'm not sure what the word would be. It has to be resolved or it has to be sort of examined and determined if that's an issue or if that's a significant problem. If you can't determine that it's good, you should put it aside.

But I think there is -- I think there is a provision in either the law or the S.E.B. rules that does put the onus on the election folks to resolve or, you know, or satisfy themselves that that is good to use before you use it.

- Q. Do you know whether any analysis was done of the machines described here after this complaint came in to determine whether they had been compromised or were otherwise unreliable for an election?
  - A. I don't know.
  - Q. Who would you ask?
  - A. I would ask either the Secretary of State

Page 56 investigator who did this or I would ask Fulton 1 County. 3 Ο. All right. Grab the next exhibit, if you would, please, which is Exhibit 6. 4 5 (Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 was marked for 6 7 identification.) THE WITNESS: Yeah, let me refresh 8 9 here. 10 BY MR. CROSS: 11 Ο. Okay. 12 Α. Okay. I've got it. 13 Ο. Okay. Do you see that Exhibit 6 is an 14 E-mail that you received from David Worley on October 10th, 2020? 15 16 Α. Yes. 17 Who is David Worley? Q. 18 David Worley at the time was the Α. 19 democratic representative to the -- appointee to 20 the State Election Board. 21 What organization was he with at this Ο. 2.2 time? 23 Well, he was the Democratic Party 24 representative, and he was a private attorney. I 2.5 don't know if that answers your question.

Page 62 on November 9, 2020, the description of the 1 violation is "many voting machines unlocked during 3 the day." 4 Do you see that? 5 Α. Yes. And the location is the Hartwell polling 6 Ο. 7 place library. Do you see that? 8 Α. Yes. And there's a Twitter link here. And if 9 10 you read the whole context of the E-mail, you'll 11 see that whoever sent this in put up photos of 12 voting machines that were apparently, according to 13 this person, unlocked during the day. 14 Do you see that? 15 Α. I see that. 16 Do you know whether there was an 17 investigation done in this situation? 18 I don't know. But again, this is one that Α. 19 I would certainly expect an investigation to have 20 been done. 21 If you wanted to review any -- review the 2.2 investigation file, any report, and understand what 23 was done and what the findings were, who would you 2.4 ask? 2.5 Α. The current acting chief, Mr. Callaway.

Page 71 my -- I -- look at my voting history, I think you'd 1 find I do it about 50/50. 3 Okay. When you voted on the B.M.D., is it 0. fair to say that you weren't able to read the Q.R. 4 5 code on your ballot to determine how that Q.R. code 6 was getting tabulated? Is that right? 7 That's correct. I -- but I did see the Α. print-out below it of what my choices were. 8 9 Ο. Okay. But you understand that the human 10 readable portion of your ballot does not count in 11 any election in terms of what gets tabulated; 12 right? 13 MR. RUSSO: Object. Objection to 14 form. 15 THE WITNESS: I would, while I would 16 generally agree, I believe, and I'd have 17 to go back and look at the code, I think 18 for -- if there's a recount or something 19 like that, then I think it does count. 20 So. 21 But generally, I agree with your 2.2 premise. 23 BY MR. CROSS: 2.4 Ο. A recount in Georgia simply rescans the 2.5 ballots; right?

Page 72 MR. RUSSO: Objection. 1 Form. 2. THE WITNESS: It does. But I'm, 3 again, I'm -- I can't cite exactly where it is in the code, but I believe there is 4 5 a provision somewhere that says, if 6 there's some inconsistency, you go with 7 what's actually printed, the name that's printed on the ballot. 8 9 BY MR. CROSS: 10 And in order to examine the human readable Ο. 11 portion for tabulation purposes, that can occur 12 only in an audit that's authorized by the Secretary 13 of State; is that right? 14 Objection to form. MR. RUSSO: 15 THE WITNESS: Again, I -- I'm not 16 sure about that. Again, I think there may 17 be some provision that, if there's some 18 type of dispute about a vote, you go with 19 the human readable form. 20 BY MR. CROSS: 21 Okay. As a voter, would you prefer to 2.2 cast a vote that's scanning human readable text for 23 the tabulation rather than a Q.R. code? 2.4 Α. Probably. 25 O. Because then you could actually, you could

read what's being tabulated in the first instance yourself; right?

- A. Well, yes. Assuming that the scanner is set up and is secure and is tabulating it in accordance with that.
- Q. Right. Are you aware that -- well, let me ask a threshold question. Are you familiar with an election security expert named Alex Halderman?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. In fact, you've, I think you've testified at hearings in this case with -- where you both testified; right?
- A. Yes. Although I've not seen -- I wasn't in the room when he testified, but I'm certainly familiar -- certainly familiar with his reputation and his work.
- Q. Okay. And what are you familiar with regarding his reputation and work?
- A. That he's considered an expert in security sys -- or election systems and security and that he's been -- I guess Judge Totenberg, I don't know what the designation is, but essentially designated him or allowed him unprecedented access to check the Georgia voting system.

So I mean, obviously he's got credentials

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- Q. Okay. And you anticipated where I was going. You mentioned that he got access to election equipment in Georgia. Are you aware that he prepared a report of nearly a hundred pages on that analysis that was provided to the State's lawyers on July 1st of last year?
- A. I just read that in the A.J.C. I think yesterday or the day before.
- Q. So you did not know that before the A.J.C. article?
- A. No. And I, remember, I had -- I essentially left the Secretary's office at the end of May.
- Q. Okay. So fair to say you have not read that report?
  - A. That's correct. I have not.
- Q. Okay. Would you expect the Secretary's office to address any significant vulnerabilities with the election system that Dr. Halderman identified in that report?
- A. I would expect the Secretary of State's office to address any vulnerabilities from any source in an evaluation of, you know, considering all the different factors that come in.

Q. Why?

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A. Well, because if there's a security issue, it needs to be -- if you can confirm that it is an issue, you'd want to -- you'd want to fix it. You may get reports that are -- that are not security issues or false reports that you want to be able to, you know, counter with a fact that, hey, this is a -- this is a false report or this is a -- this flaw doesn't exist or whatever the case may be, I think.

But I would expect them to certainly consider anything that would come in that would be able to secure the system.

Q. And is it fair to say that taking reasonable measures to mitigate known vulnerabilities with an election system and being able to tell voters that you've done that, that that helps drive voter confidence in the election system?

MR. RUSSO: Objection. Form.

THE WITNESS: Can you ask the first

part of that again?

23 BY MR. CROSS:

Q. Sure. Taking measures to mitigate known vulnerabilities with an election system and being

Page 76 able to tell voters that those measures have been 1 2. taken, without getting into specifics, just letting voters know that measures have been taken to 3 address known vulnerabilities with an election 4 5 system, would you expect that to help drive voter 6 confidence in that system? 7 MR. RUSSO: Objection to form again. I would think it would 8 THE WITNESS: 9 be helpful. 10 BY MR. CROSS: 11 As a voter yourself, would you have more 12 confidence in a system where known vulnerabilities 13 have been addressed or in a system where known vulnerabilities have not been addressed for six 14 15 months or more? 16 MR. RUSSO: Objection to form. Lacks 17 relevance. 18 THE WITNESS: I'd want issues 19 addressed. 20 BY MR. CROSS: 21 Okay. You were still with the Secretary's 2.2 office in September 2020 when Dr. Halderman 23 testified in a hearing before Judge Totenberg in 24 this case; right? 2.5 Α. Yes, I was.

Q. And I won't get into the specifics of his testimony, but just at a general level, were you aware that he testified and actually did a demonstration by video for the judge showing that he was able to hack Georgia's B.M.D. equipment?

MR. RUSSO: Objection to form.

THE WITNESS: No, I'm not aware of that.

## BY MR. CROSS:

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Q. So even when you were the elections director, no one informed you that Dr. Halderman in the span of only three days with Fulton County's B.M.D. equipment was able to hack it where it would produce Q.R. codes that did not match the selections on the B.M.D.?

MR. RUSSO: Objection to form. And lacks foundation.

THE WITNESS: I don't believe I -- I don't believe I was aware of that.

## BY MR. CROSS:

- Q. Isn't that something you would expect to know as the elections director so that you could at least be aware of that vulnerability in the system?
  - A. Yeah, I would want to know that.
  - Q. And so is it fair to say you're also not

Page 78 1 aware of any measures taken by the Secretary's office or any county to address that vulnerability? 3 MR. RUSSO: Same objection. I'm not aware of 4 THE WITNESS: 5 anything that was -- that came as a result 6 of what you're saying he did. 7 BY MR. CROSS: Okay. All right. Take a look at Exhibit 8 Ο. 9 8, if you would, please. 10 (Whereupon, Plaintiff's 11 Exhibit 8 was marked for 12 identification.) 13 MR. RUSSO: And David, before we go 14 into this. I need to take a break in about 15 seven minutes so we can swap. I have 16 another matter to deal with that I 17 mentioned earlier. 18 MR. CROSS: Do you want --19 MR. RUSSO: I don't know how long --20 yeah, I don't know how long you're going 21 to need on this exhibit. I'm not -- my 2.2 computer actually hasn't even brought it 23 up yet, but. 2.4 MR. CROSS: I don't need to take 2.5 long. I think we can get through this and

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reporting page. But it -- but it never leaves the E.M.S. It stays on the E.M.S. And what's on the E.M.S. is the official -- the official vote.

- Q. Where do the counties get the U.S.B. drives that they use to copy the election results from the E.M.S. into the E.N.R. system?
- A. I think initially we sent them some U.S.B. drives to do that. I think we had -- we had talked about having a procedure where we would send them a new U.S.B. drive before every election and, basically, have it be disposable.

I don't know if they -- if they adopted that. We hadn't had any other elections before I left.

- Q. Okay. So before you left, the counties were typically reusing the U.S.B. drives instead of getting new ones from the State for each election?
- A. They all got new ones for -- with the new system, but I couldn't -- I couldn't tell you if some counties may have reused them or used old systems or got -- old drives or got new drives.
- Q. Who would you ask if you wanted to know the answer to that question? Is that a county level question?
  - A. I think you'd have to ask each county.

work with E.M.S.

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Now, you know, they often would have the techs at their side doing it, again, in some sense maybe walking them through the process or confirming that they were doing the right thing.

But it was -- it was our expectation of the counties that the counties were doing that.

Now, you know, depending on how good somebody was with the E.M.S. system, they may have had more or less help with it from a tech.

- Q. Who at the state level has administrator access to voting equipment in Georgia?
- A. Well, what -- I mean, that's a very big question. The -- as far as the local E.M.S. and things like that, those would be county restrictions. So nobody at the state would have access to, you know, Cobb County's E.M.S. password.

We would have -- I think state employees might have access to the E.N.R. system to help a county, like, if they got logged out or something like that.

But generally speaking, the passwords and the access to local election equipment are -- the state election equipment that's operated by the counties is a county issue that we wouldn't have.

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I certainly didn't have a notebook that had, you know, county passwords or anything like that. And nor do I believe anyone in the state did.

- Q. Who has administrator access to components of the election system at the state level?
- A. Well, I guess it depends on what components you're talking about. For ENet it would generally be I would have access. The assistant administrator would have had access.

Merritt Beaver and/or people he designated in his team would have had access. I believe Kevin Rayburn when he was the deputy would have had access. But a pretty small number of people for the -- for the ENet system, and pretty much everything else was local.

I mean, there were -- there are no other really connected networks that talk to each other. I mean, the Lowndes County E.M.S. didn't talk with the -- anything at the state. It had to be -- the data had to be pulled from it and sent to E.N.R. for us to get it.

So there wasn't -- there really weren't statewide networks except for ENet.

Q. Okay. So you had passwords, you had

Page 217 experience as the elections director for Georgia, 1 are you aware of any effort by anyone to alter or 3 manipulate the outcome of the 2020 election in Georgia? 4 5 Α. No. Is that something that you would expect to 6 7 have been brought to your attention if someone at 8 the Secretary's office had learned that something 9 like that had happened? 10 MR. MILLER: Objection. Calls for 11 speculation. 12 I would have -- I would THE WITNESS: 13 expect something like that to be brought 14 to my attention. 15 BY MR. CROSS: 16 As a voter in Georgia, is it important to 17 you that your vote is counted as you intended it to be counted? 18 19 Yes. Α. 20 Q. Why? 21 Because that's one of my fundamental Α. 2.2 rights. 23 What if the election outcome comes out the Ο. 24 way you want it but your vote had not been counted, 2.5 would that matter to you?

Page 218 It would. 1 Α. Ο. Why? 3 Well, assuming that I cast my vote legally Α. and properly, each -- my vote should be a record. 4 5 Okay. Are you aware of a situation where 6 election workers, when they were transmitting 7 ballots coming out of the B.M.D. system, they stopped at one of the election workers' homes, one 8 9 of them took a shower, the ballots sat in their cars in the driveway for some period of time, and 10 11 then they finally made it on to the county election 12 facility where those ballots were supposed to be stored and the results were supposed to be 13 14 transmitted to the State? 15 MR. MILLER: Object to form. 16 I believe I recall THE WITNESS: 17 that. I -- although I don't remember 18 where it was. But that sounds -- that 19 sounds familiar. 20 BY MR. CROSS: 21 Fair to say that's not consistent with 2.2 State protocol or County protocol; right? 2.3 Α. I agree. 2.4 Okay. Do you know of any efforts that Ο. 2.5 were taken to confirm that that incident did not

	Page 219
1	affect the tabulation of the ballots in that county
2	for that election?
3	MR. MILLER: Objection. Lacks
4	foundation.
5	THE WITNESS: I I'm not aware of
6	follow-up steps to that.
7	BY MR. CROSS:
8	Q. Who would you ask if you wanted to know?
9	A. Probably the county election director.
10	Q. Okay.
11	MR. CROSS: All right. Let's go off
12	the record. I'm pretty close to done.
13	Let me just look at my notes real quick,
14	if that's all right, Mr. Harvey.
15	THE WITNESS: Sure.
16	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 2:10
17	p.m. We're off the record.
18	(Whereupon, a discussion ensued
19	off the record.)
20	(Whereupon, there was a brief
21	recess.)
22	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 2:15
23	p.m. We're on the record.
24	BY MR. CROSS:
25	Q. Mr. Harvey, is voter confidence in an

Page 282 REPORTER CERTIFICATE 1 STATE OF GEORGIA ) 2 COBB COUNTY 3 I, Debra M. Druzisky, a Certified Court 4 Reporter in and for the State of Georgia, do hereby 5 certify: That prior to being examined, the witness named in the foregoing deposition was by me duly 6 sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth, and 7 nothing but the truth; That said deposition was taken before me 8 at the time and place set forth and was taken down by me in shorthand and thereafter reduced to computerized transcription under my direction and 9 supervision. And I hereby certify the foregoing deposition is a full, true and correct transcript 10 of my shorthand notes so taken. 11 Review of the transcript was requested. If requested, any changes made by the deponent and 12 provided to the reporter during the period allowed are appended hereto. 13 I further certify that I am not of kin or counsel to the parties in the case, and I am not in the regular employ of counsel for any of the said 14 parties, nor am I in any way financially interested in the result of said case. 15 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto 16 subscribed my name this 11th day of February, 2022. 17 18 Whath hygistry 19 20 Debra M. Druzisky Georgia CCR-B-1848 21 22 23 24 25